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U.S. Commercial Space Launch Industry: Responding to the Market
The U.S. Commercial Space Launch Industry:
RESPONDING TO THE MARKET
By 
Ralph De Palma
INTRODUCTION:
The International Space Year, 1992, was an ephemeral 
period that helped usher in a new exiting era in commer­ 
cial space launch. This era will include further 
globalization of the industry, with sharply broadened 
international business relationships being established that 
wouldn't have been possible a few short years earlier. 
Greater cooperation is occurring among the nations of the 
world conducting space research and exploration. Former 
adversaries are now business partners. New technologies 
and smaller systems hold the promise of the economical 
proliferation of new commercial communications systems 
that will change our lives.
The fall of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union have created dramatic changes and opportu­ 
nities for the U.S. commercial launch service providers. 
These challenges require equally bold responses. With the 
signing and forthcoming ratification of the START II 
Treaty, a reduction of the U.S. strategic defense space 
launch requirements will occur accompanied with a shift 
in space policy focus. Historic opportunities are now 
possible to convert the over capacity of military capabili­ 
ties to value added, high wage, high growth commercial 
activities.
Coupled with these events is an emerging market for the 
launch of small commercial satellites that is predicated on 
the worldwide need for mobile communications services. 
As the global economy has become more intermeshed the 
need for modernized communication systems in develop­ 
ing regions and newly independent regions has grown to 
enormous proportions. Latin America is expected to 
spend over $110 billion by 2000 modernizing telecommu­ 
nications in the region. Development and trade activity is 
very closely tied with the ability to communicate freely. 
Terrestrial communications in developing nations are 
expensive to initiate and install and even more expensive 
to maintain and operate. The most cost effective way for 
a region to join the modern telecommunications world is 
via satellite systems. A new element in satellite commu­ 
nications that should be available in the next 4-5 years is 
mobile satellite cellular service. In this concept the
terrestrial cellular tower is replaced by a system of low 
earth orbit (LEO) satellites. One of the proposed private 
systems requires 66 satellites for global coverage. There 
are eight proposed systems pending FCC approval that 
could require the launch of up to 250 satellites costing a 
total of $7 billion. Not all are expected to be built and 
operated but the successful systems will clearly impact 
the marketplace for commercial launch services in ways 
that can yet be imagined. Responding to this market will 
require serious attention by U.S. launch service providers 
and a new approach to launch site infrastructure and 
regulatory procedures by government authorities.
The U.S. invented the launch market for commercial 
telecommunications satellites in the 1960's and domi­ 
nated the industry for two decades. Today we face 
increasing foreign competition in the launch industry as 
well as in the more lucrative satellite manufacturing and 
satellite services industries. The European consortium 
Arianespace is clearly recognized as the commercial 
launch industry leader with over 50% of the global 
market. The $5 billion U.S. commercial space industry 
has been the leading aerospace growth sector, despite the 
U.S decline in commercial launch market share. It is a 
significant factor in the face of the declining defense and 
civil government aerospace markets in 1991,1992, and 
similar projections through the remainder of the decade. 
The Department of Commerce predicts commercial 
growth at an annual rate of over 14% for the remainder of 
the decade. Coupled with predicted flat growth in future 
NASA budgeting, the commercial space market will 
surpass NASA budget appropriations by the year 2000. 
In addition serious advances in space telecommunications 
projects and technologies described above, could move 
the commercial growth projections even higher.
The mainstay of the current commercial launch market 
has been the medium class telecommunications satellite 
that is positioned in a fixed geosynchronous earth orbit 
(GEO) 2 degree slot 22,300 miles above the earth. The 
satellites are usually manufactured over an 18-24 month 
process can cost as much as $ 100 million, and are 
expected to generate over $1 billion in revenue in a ten
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year life span. They can require as much as a $500 
million investment in ground infrastructure to be fully 
utilized. The average launch costs are between $50-60 
million dollars. Insuring a satellite launch varies between 
16-20% of overall satellite cost and it can take as long as 
five years from planning to on-orbit operations of a single 
satellite.
This is a mature well defined market with a limited 
number of participants and a small number of very 
expensive launch events annually. With the relatively 
small number of funded medium class payloads (Depart­ 
ment of Commerce estimates 12-16 annually) and the 
expanding line-up of international launch services 
available, it is today, without question, a buyers market 
for commercial launch services. Commercial space 
launch customers have more alternatives than ever to the 
once dominant U.S. launch services.
The key element in the discussion of promoting the U.S. 
commercial launch industry, is the need for change. 
Change is mandatory in our approach to industry regula­ 
tion and oversight, change is clearly needed in our 
approach to planning and execution, change is required in 
our long term vision for the U.S. commercial space 
launch industry. The Clinton administration comes to the 
industry table with a mandate to change the way govern­ 
ment does business and to break the commercial space 
policy grid-lock in Washington. The commercial space 
launch industry is a potential test case to invoke new 
economic theory, and reinvigorate a vital U.S. industrial 
base, before we succeed in exporting another high wage, 
high growth industry that the U.S. once lead.
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
The September 11,1992 decision by the Bush administra­ 
tion granting several U.S. manufacturers of satellites 5 
export licenses to China for launch on the Long March 
vehicle, was viewed by many industry experts both U.S. 
and European as being motivated by political ramifica­ 
tions rather than strategic trade issues. The State Depart­ 
ment announced the decision without the normal consul­ 
tation with other agencies such as the Department of 
Transportation. DoT fears that a non-market economy 
such as China could dilute an already thin marketplace 
with a launch service that cannot be compared on an equal 
basis with western launch services. A State Department 
representative declared that the agreement would create 
jobs and reduce the deficit balance of trade with China. 
The effect on the balance of payments was only partially 
correct. Three of the export licenses will be for non- 
Chinese organizations to purchase the satellites, conse­
quently the trade impacts will be with those nations. The 
overall effect however is a net loss of revenue for domes­ 
tic launch service providers and that could reduce jobs 
and weaken the industry. The signals sent to financial 
interests could be interpreted as destabilizing and there­ 
fore increase the risk assessments to the investment 
capital markets, further weakening the launch service 
industries ability to borrow.
Much discussion has taken place over the entrance into 
the world launch services marketplace by both China and 
Russia (CIS). There influence is feared by the U.S. and 
European launch service providers alike. The arguments 
put forward include suggestions that China and the CIS 
will be dumping services on the open market that do not 
fairly reflect costs because of their socialized political 
structures. The U.S. and Europe should tread very lightly 
in this area. Protectionist attitudes can easily influence 
those organizations that are not currently operating in the 
true private sector to begin with.
It is entirely correct to say that the Chinese have a 
different system for determining me fair market value of 
their launch services and this could be harmful to interna­ 
tional competition based on fair market systems. It is 
quite different however in the case of the CIS. The 
former Soviet Union had an industrial production and 
launch capability that at one time was capable of putting 
over one hundred payloads into orbit per year. The U.S. 
has been averaging a little over 20 orbital launches per 
year from the Cape at near full capacity as determined by 
the Air Force. During the first 48 hours after the invasion 
of Kuwait the Soviets launched seven military payloads 
into orbit. The explanation for this robustness is the 
development of standardized cheap expendable launch 
systems and relatively simple standardized spacecraft. By 
complete accident the former Soviet technologies are very 
commercially competitive by western standards, and the 
near launch on demand capabilities, are the commercial 
launch service providers Val Halla. The point is, their 
robustness is not a function of investment in advanced 
sophisticated space flight hardware and infrastructure as 
much as an investment in simplified industrial engineer­ 
ing processes that work quickly and efficiently and could 
be termed very market oriented. The Russians were 
recently allowed a one time exemption to compete for the 
launch of an American made satellite owned by Inmarsat. 
Their bid price was almost 40% lower ($35 million) than 
the closest European or U.S. launcher (approximately $60 
million). Space experts visiting the CIS recently com­ 
mented, that because of their effective industrial engineer­ 
ing approach to mass produce vehicles and provide swift 
integration and launch, their bid price could indeed reflect
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the true costs of launch service that could be compared on 
an equal basis with western market oriented organiza­ 
tions.
The U.S. will be forced to respond to this segment of the 
competitive environment The Russians have asked for 
greater U.S. cooperation and help in marketing practically 
everything that is not bolted down in their space program. 
India has already indicated interest in Russian made 
propulsion systems. The Japanese held talks of purchas­ 
ing various Russian systems up to and including the MIR 
space station. Russian Zenit boosters could pop up at a 
number of potential sites including Kourou as strap-on 
boosters for Ariane V. While the Europeans are denounc­ 
ing the Russian entrance into the commercial launch 
industry, they are moving along signing agreement after 
agreement with the Russians regarding the use of the MIR 
and manned spaceflight technology, and are even consid­ 
ering Russian entrance into the European Space Agency. 
The French and Russians have also recently conducted 
joint hypersonic scramjet test (Nov. 17,1992), and signed 
a long term hypersonic research agreement. The huge 
U.S. lead in hypersonics technology we once held appears 
to be dwindling rapidly. This is a critical 21st century 
technology that the Russians offered to jointly research 
with the U.S. first After the U.S. turned down the 
opportunity they found new partners quickly. By ignor­ 
ing or discounting the Russian overtures we have helped 
create our new competition in this technology.
One unique response to the marketplace was a December 
29,1992 announcement between Lockheed Corporation 
and the Russian Khrunichev Enterprise that manufactures 
among other things the Proton expendable launch vehicle. 
Lockheed /Khrunichev International (LKI) will be a joint 
venture that will permit Lockheed to market the Proton 
launch vehicle and conduct payload integration at the 
Baikonur launch site in Kazakhstan or Plesetsk in Russia. 
This will provide Lockheed with access to the commercial 
launch services market through a reliable launch system 
with huge commercial potential.
The impact of LKI agreement is not as clearly negative as 
some U.S. launch interests would like to believe. The 
U.S. does not dominate the commercial launch industry 
the Europeans do. It is not clear whose market share is 
more vulnerable to the Proton. The U.S. manufactured 
communications satellites will be sparingly allowed 
export licenses for launch by Russia. The Proton could 
actually be of greater threat to Arianespace dominance 
than to the U.S. segment. The threat presented by the LKI 
agreement to 10% or even 20% of the domestic launch 
industry revenue stream does not out weigh the benefit to 
U.S. / Russian trade, the potential for launch technology
transfer improving the long term U.S. launch industry, 
and the prevention of further domination of the market by 
European interests. The Lockheed response to the 
international market environment may be the most 
appropriate from our current market position.
Rocket Systems Corporation of Japan has already entered 
competition for commercial launches before the first 
flight of their H-2 booster, bidding for an Inmarsat-3 
satellite launch contract. Three H-2 test flights are 
planned in 1993 and 1994, with the first commercial 
payload expected to be launched by 1995. Rocket 
Systems is lobbying the Japanese government to lift the 
restrictions by local tuna fisherman that prevent more than 
2 launch windows (in February and August), per year 
from the Tanegashima launch site. Their launch site is 
30.5 degrees north latitude on one of the southernmost 
islands of Japan. The H-l rocket was licensed U.S. Delta 
technology and by agreement could only be used for the 
launching of indigenous National Space Development 
Agency (NASDA) payloads essentially freezing Japan out 
of the commercial launch industry. The H-2 is the first 
completely Japanese booster and allows unrestricted 
entrance into the commercial marketplace.
Here again we find Rocket Systems Corporation a 
consortium of 77 Japanese industrial firms, banks, and 
insurance companies lead by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 
working cohesively with the Japanese space agency 
NASDA similarly to the ESA-Arianespace relationship. 
Rocket Systems will oversee production and marketing of 
the H-2 after the initial flight tests are conducted, and will 
also handle final testing, quality control, user 
developmenUidvanced planning, and some launch site 
operations earlier done by NASDA, very similar to the 
ES A-Arianespace working relationships. The H-2 will 
also be very similar in performance to the Ariane-4, but 
currently has a much higher price tag of about $ 110 
million per launch. Rocket Systems hopes to reduce 
booster costs by gaining efficiencies from placing block 
orders of boosters, again strikingly similar to 
Arianespace.
According to industry processing teams contacted the 
$330 million dollar H-2 facilities complete with Vehicle 
Assembly Building and crawler at Tanegashima rival 
those at Kourou or the U.S. for modern state of the art 
processing of commercial payloads. Many commercial 
analysts feel that this commitment by Japanese interests 
coupled with their overwhelming international trade 
experience could add considerable competition to an 
already rabid marketplace. The Japanese response to the 
market looms formidably on the commercial launch 
industry horizon.
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WINNING STRATEGY
In today's marketplace for U.S. launchers there appears to 
be several structural and policy disadvantages that helps 
create competitive weakness. Those disadvantages 
include the obvious aging flight hardware technology and 
support infrastructure, but they also include a regulatory 
policy system that is in need of complete review and 
restructure to accommodate the post-cold war realities of 
the global marketplace. Addressing technology issues 
without curing the industry regulatory problems will not 
guarantee improvement in the U.S. competitive position. 
Addressing the regulatory issues immediately, will 
provide a significant competitive stimulus in the shortest 
period of time for minimal costs. Combining both 
approaches is a winning strategy.
The U.S. commercial space regulatory system that has 
evolved over a number of years and is encumbered with 
safety, cost, and scheduling, requirements that have 
served adequately the cold war era military and civilian 
government launch segments but do not successfully 
address the post-cold war commercial launch industry 
competitiveness issues. Almost every discussion in the 
recent past regarding the space launch industry has been 
from a perspective that placed more significance on the 
national security strategic interests control over launch 
sites and launch capabilities, than on the development of 
commercial markets. For the commercial launch industry 
to proliferate a basic national policy priority shift must 
occur.
Commercial space transportation must be considered a 
basic regulated commercial industrial operation and 
allowed to become a normalized transportation segment. 
The demystification of the processes and problems 
associated with transporting payloads from launch site to 
orbit is the foremost challenge presenting the U.S. 
industry. It is possible for national security to be main­ 
tained and commercial industries to thrive coincidentally. 
Airports and seaports have mastered these obstacles for 
decades and it is now time for the space transportation 
industry to overcome the same parochialisms that have 
limited the growth of U.S. commercial launchers. Our 
international competitors have successfully normalized 
their launch services. The current regulatory environment 
administered by the military no longer serves the nations 
long range goals in space. To compete we must embrace 
the changes required and move on. The post-cold war era 
now allows new thinking and innovative solutions to old 
regulatory issues. The glofraj market place for space 
launch services i§ no place for governnnent agency turf 
battles, protectionism, or isolationism.
OLD THINKING:
The most serious U.S. jauncfr industry competitiveness 
factor is "old thin^nfl"- Blue Ribbon panels have been 
convened in the past several years to make recommenda­ 
tions on the future of the U.S. space program including 
the commercial launch industry. All have been headed by 
well meaning individuals caught up in a system congested 
with cold war based "old thinking". Issues and recom­ 
mendations regarding commercial space that resulted 
were listless. The best description of the effects of "old 
thinking" is the graying of black and white issues, the 
blurring of lines of authority, and the issuing of authority 
without responsibility or accountability. No consensus is 
established no sense of direction or definitive strategy 
imparted and consequently the ideas and recommenda­ 
tions become muddled and are largely ignored. Most 
large, multi-year, multi-federal agency space technology 
programs have taken on many of these characteristics. 
They no longer appear to provide the Apollo style 
enthusiasm and dedication. They attract a different 
element, one that is more cynical and pragmatic and less 
idealistic and energetic. The U.S. can no longer afford 
more of this type of leadership in the commercial space 
industry.
An example of "old thinking" is the recent "Spacelifter" 
recommendation. Even if the decade long development 
period could be somehow mitigated, this approach to 
solving our technology problems no longer works. By 
combining all the requirements of the government and 
commercial industry into one core vehicle, it is doomed to 
failure under the weight of its own requirements. Mixing 
the requirements for manned and unmanned vehicles as 
well as Defense and commercial contracting, will dilute 
the benefit of any new technology gains.
The Air Force C5 heavy lift military aircraft, designed to 
transport troops and armor with a high degree of operabil- 
ity from less developed airfields, has never been utilized 
for commercial cargo operations. Commercial market 
forces dictated the more reliable and less expensive and 
simpler design of the Boeing 747F. Both aircraft have 
specific roles and serve their respective markets well. 
Mixing both requirements into one vehicle would have 
resulted in an inefficient expensive design serving neither.
NEW THINKING:
Privatization and industrial commercialization is taking 
root around the world in places were former military 
dictatorships, juntas, and communist authoritarian states 
once stood. The role these former governments have
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played in restricting the economic growth and debilitating 
the advance of international trade in their regions is now 
clear to their populations, and with few exceptions seems 
very unlikely to return. The rest of the world seems to be 
committed to developing global markets, regional trade 
agreements, and generally competitive economic har­ 
mony. One exception appears to be the approach to 
governing and regulating the commercial space launch 
industry in the United States. Today the Air Force seems 
pitted against other federal agencies and is more con­ 
cerned with protecting historical turf, than cooperating 
with commercial and civilian organizations to regain U.S. 
competitiveness in this marketplace.
When Europe developed the Ariane vehicle, it was 
designed from the very beginning to accommodate 
commercial payloads. A very important decision oc­ 
curred in 1978 that was to determine the fate of me 
European commercial launch industry. The Europeans 
recognized the proper role for governments to play in 
commercializing space launch technology. Basic technol­ 
ogy research and design functions that require large 
infrastructure and facilities which can serve other space 
systems design, were determined to be the proper role for 
the European Space Agency (ESA). In January of 1980 
the member nations agreed to allow the Ariane booster to 
be mass produced and marketed by the first private launch 
service organization Arianespace. This decision is now 
regarded as an epic crossroads in European and the global 
space industry.
The Europeans determined that operating a fully func­ 
tional space launch system was the role of the private 
sector. Negotiating booster manufacturing, marketing, 
financing, underwriting, and conducting the launches are 
all handled by a relatively small cadre of specialists (just 
over 200) with the speed and flexibility that only the 
private sector can provide. Arianespace is a private 
corporation created under French Napoleanic law that 
allows Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES) the 
French Space Agency to be a partner along with 36 
private European aerospace and electronics companies 
and 13 major banks. Combining all these resources and 
not becoming overwhelmed by bureaucracy is in itself 
somewhat of a marvel. Arianespace is by no means 
perfect, however their success in the marketplace is 
difficult to dispute.
CUSTOMER ORIENTATION:
One of the subtle differences between the Arianespace 
operation at Kourou and the the commercial launch 
operations at the Cape is the level of attention paid to the
customer requirements. In a commercial industry were 
there is more than one buyer and seller the amount of 
attention paid to a client or potential client is an important 
part of the product or service marketed. Arianespace 
appears to understand these factors better than the Air 
Force at the Cape, because it is a private organization and 
conducts business mainly with other private organiza­ 
tions.
According to the commercial satellite owners and 
processing teams contacted for this study, there is a high 
degree of attention paid to requirements of the Range at 
the Cape, with a minimal degree of attention paid to the 
requirements of the commercial customer. The initial 
review of a spacecraft to be launched from the Cape is 
conducted by the Range beginning long before its final 
assembly. The disposition of the Range requirements can 
and usually does take from 4-8 months. If any addi­ 
tional customer requirement occur in that time frame prior 
to arrival at the Cape (they almost certainly do) they are 
likely to receive even less of a priority than the initial 
Range requirements. Processing teams and customers 
consequently arrive at the Cape and spend a great deal of 
expensive processing time chasing approvals for minor 
changes and late requirements. According to the custom­ 
ers contacted, commercial processing teams are treated as 
something abnormal that happens to occur infrequently at 
the Cape, as opposed to the normal government payload 
customers. The entire process has been termed by all 
former customers contacted as highly adversarial (a 
search for problems) rather than participatory in its 
approach.
When discussing certain campaigns or processing teams 
with Arianespace their representatives are quick to name 
key members of teams as respected professionals. The 
Arianespace managers could discuss by name team 
members and how much experience each had, how many 
launch campaigns they have worked, and in some cases 
organizational idiosyncrasies. A higher degree of 
comradre appears to evolve in this process between the 
processing teams, customers, and Arianespace. The small 
size of Arianespace (approx. 200) and the low turnover 
rate of launch site personnel may account for part this 
phenomena. However it goes to a much deeper organiza­ 
tional commitment to service. Several of the teams stated 
that the U.S. companies provide launches and 
Arianespace provides Launch service. The huge number 
of people involved in the processing approval and launch 
activities at the Cape and the constant turnover of key 
military personnel does not allow this accumulated 
customer knowledge base to occur. When discussing 
satellite processing teams with A/F approval offices the
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conversation usually shifts to the launch service provider 
teams as the best known and trusted personnel and the 
payload customers and manufacturers are associated with 
being outsiders.
To effectively respond to the market an attitudinal 
adjustment in orders of magnitude is required, or a 
complete shift to a civilian run customer oriented com­ 
mercial launch industry at the launch sites. NASA had 
earlier assumed the role of marketing commercial launch 
services on the Space Shuttle in the early 80's. The 
results were heavy subsidy, constant delays, and gross 
inefficiency. The Challenger accident and subsequent 
policy change removed NASA from the marketplace. 
Currently the U.S. Air Force is not faring much better in 
overseeing the commercial expendable vehicles. The Air 
Force maintains the manifesting, controls access to 
facilities, and generally disrupts the other market forces 
which dictate to commercial payload owners when and 
for how much a payload should be launched. With the 
European approach those functions are only entrusted to 
the customer oriented private launch authorities, and they 
just happen to be the most successful commercial launch 
organization in the world, Arianespace. This type of new 
wave government industrial policy that defines the 
government role in commercial space as purveyor of basic 
technology research, is being applied in Japan, and even 
the former Soviet Union. Soon to successfully compete, 
the U.S. will be forced to alter its approach to regulating 
the commercial space launch industry or be driven from 
the marketplace.
U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE POLICY AT A 
CROSSROADS:
The government is by far the largest single customer of 
U.S. launch services and today only a fraction of those 
services are procured commercially. With only one 
customer dictating non-market, government procurement 
oriented procedures and requirements, the impact is felt 
by the smaller commercial market sector as well. By 
responding to the needs of the government, U.S. launch 
service providers have incurred built-in overhead that acts 
as a deterrent to international competitiveness. The 
unabridged documentation requirements, the 
government's rigid inefficient procurement process, the 
convoluted launch approval process, the layers of govern­ 
ment authorities, and the general government works 
program approach to the launch industry, have stacked the 
deck against U.S. commercial launch service providers.
The Cape and other launch sites have over the years been 
accustomed to large government programs covering
multiple launches of medium and large payloads which 
can last many years. Commercial customers with a single 
medium payload to launch every so often, are foreign to 
this cultural environment. The impact of commercial 
space on the Cape operating environment to date has been 
minimal. Payloads are approved, integrated, tested, and 
launched with little regard to their pedigree. Medium 
class commercial payloads in general have been assimi­ 
lated into the existing launch operations infrastructure and 
treated very similar to government payloads
Just over the horizon however are several commercial 
projects now being planned that could provide the growth 
opportunities and launch activity needed to stimulate a 
new commercial marketplace. These new commercial 
payloads will be smaller with improved miniaturized 
technology and less expensive to manufacture, launch, 
and operate. They pose minimal technological risks and 
in most cases require little or no development time, can be 
prepared and launched with a small very responsive team. 
Lightsat or small satellite technology has been around for 
a long time. The need for for small systems in the past 
were generally for unique missions, or basic research, and 
never generated the serious interest that would stimulate 
the investment in small launch system infrastructure.
SMALL PAYLOAD LAUNCH
The emerging market for small satellites to conduct useful 
research and provide commercially viable applications 
appears to be coming to fruition. The widespread use of 
small systems has not occurred until now because of the 
success of the larger GEO commercial payloads, and the 
reliance by the government systems on large long lead 
time projects.
They are driven by the need for global commercial 
communication services and not government procure­ 
ments. The Low Earth Orbit (LEO) communications 
satellite constellations that have been proposed by eight 
different organizations vary from constellations of 12 to 
66 small satellites (under 2000 Ibs.) per system. The LEO 
communications systems will provide cellular communi­ 
cation with space based resources instead of ground based 
antennae cells. The larger more expensive systems will 
offer voice, data, and FAX. The smaller systems will 
deliver data and FAX. Most will provide positioning and 
location services, either independently or linked to the 
Global Positioning System.
There is one common question that arises during every 
discussion of the LEO 4s "Is the market real?" The 
market for the LEO satellite communication systems is as
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real as the cellular market. The existing cellular industry 
is one of todays fastest growing communications sectors 
with over 100,000 cellular phones sold daily. The LEO 
systems offer a dramatic extension and global expansion 
of this marketplace. Mobile communications systems 
have the potential to alter and stimulate the global 
business culture, play an essential role in emergency 
disaster relief, enhance the work of environmental 
monitoring systems, and provide a stabilizing effect on 
political environments. Recent articles have appeared in 
the Wall Street Journal quoting financial analysts lend 
credence to the market potential for these ventures. The 
question now is not so much "is the market real", but how 
much market is there, and which organizations will 
actually make it.
market share. With thin profit margins the launch site 
costs will have to be controlled a great deal more than 
with medium class payloads.
Currently the Federal Communications Commission is 
reviewing license applications. Several licensees expect 
to be fully licensed by the summer of 1993. The com­ 
bined total of these proposed systems could require as 
many as 250 launches by the year 2000 with a price tag of 
over $7 billion. Not all plans will come to fruition, 
however the U.S. launch industry should be taking steps 
now to reap the benefits of this growth sector.
IMPACT ON THE CURRENT LAUNCH 
MARKET
LOW EARTH ORBIT (LEO) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
SYSTEM ORGANIZATION NO. OF ORBITAL 
SATELLITES LOCATION
INfTIAL 
OPERATIONS
PROJECTED 
COSTS
IRIDfUM
GLOBALSTAR
ODYSSEY
ELLIPSO
ORBCOMM
STARSYS 
AIRE8 
VITASAT
LEOSAT
Motorola
Lorat/Quafeomm
TRW
Ellipsat Corp.
Orbital Communications
NACLS, me. 
Constellation Communications 
VITA Corp.
Leo sat Corp.
66
48
12
12
24
24 
48 
3
18
LEO
LEO
MED. ORBnr
ELIPTICAL
LEO
LEO 
LEO 
LEO
LEO
1998
1997
1997
1996
1995
1995 
1996
PHASE t OPERATING
1996
$3.7 BILLION
$875 MILLION
$1.4 BILLION
$254 MILLION
$255 MILLION
$250 MILLION 
$292 MILLION 
$10 MILLION
$100 MILLION
TOTALS 256
The LEO systems will require multiple launches for initial 
operations. Integrating multiple satellites is not com­ 
pletely foreign to the Cape but will require a much 
different approach to test and checkout, safety approvals 
of multiple identical satellites, and scheduling of limited 
resources along side the current market for medium class 
GEO payloads. Low earth orbit payloads will have 
limited life spans of 4-5 years as opposed to 10 for GEO 
satellites. Satellite replacement, upgrading, and logistical 
flights will require a near launch on demand capability. 
The new systems will be highly competitive, therefore 
reliability and maintainability will be key to providing 
quality customer cellular and data services and capturing
The LEO satellite market 
has the potential to 
institute an entirely new 
approach to commercial 
launch service. Throw 
weight muscle will be 
replaced with efficiency, 
flexibility, and operabil- 
ity. Today the infrastruc­ 
ture at the Cape and other 
facilities is barely 
compatible with todays 
marketplace. The LEO 
systems will force a 
degree of operability that 
cannot be met in terms of 
existing capabilities and 
facilities. To date the 
U.S. launch site operators 
have not acknowledged 
the requirements to 
support the LEO launch 
market. The magnitude 
of this potential needs to
be analyzed by the Department of Transportation. Long 
range planning and infrastructure funding needs to be 
determined and a plan of action committed to. Ground 
support systems will be required to handle peak loads of 
launch activity during satellite initial activities and future 
system upgrades. Today's GEO satellites are usually 
replaced after there ten year life span with a larger 
capacity spacecraft. Station keeping, guidance and 
control technology, and routine functions have changed 
very little over the development cycles. The LEO 
systems will be smaller more numerous and flexible. 
Technology obsolescence driving system upgrades will be
$7.136 BILLION
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a constant issue with the service providers looking to 
maintain a competitive edge.
The commercial launch market will be drastically affected 
by smaller spacecraft with more launch frequency. There 
will be new opportunities for federal, state, and industry 
relationships based on mutual benefit from a growing 
dynamic space launch segment. New approaches will 
need to be tested including technical and non-technical. 
Space launch insurance for multiple satellite systems will 
present different risk analysis issues for underwriters. 
The larger number of events should help benefit both 
spacecraft and launch vehicle manufacturers with im­ 
proved industrial engineering practices and efficiencies of 
scale. Producing satellites in groups of 48 instead of 
individual custom orders, will create a production system 
that can drive similar improvements in launch vehicles 
and ground support equipment.
The LEO industry competitiveness will force a new 
criteria for launch response times. Having single or 
multiple failures in an operating communications constel­ 
lation, can affect the revenue stream but even more 
importantly can allow ones competitors a significant 
marketing advantage. Reliability and dependability is 
evident in todays competition in the long distance 
telecommunications markets. Sprint, MCI, and AT&T 
are all competing on service more than any other factor. 
For the LEO systems to provide quality reliable service, a 
logistical support system that includes on orbit spares, 
rapid response launch vehicles, and flexible launch 
scheduling is essential. These factors are all desirable 
today but will be almost required to support the LEO 
market. The launch site infrastructures and procedures 
will need to considerable change to achieve these goals.
Smaller systems are much more vulnerable to the effects 
of fluctuating launch costs. A new approach will be 
necessary by the launch site in defining expenses and 
holding the line for identical launch processes. Commer­ 
cial operators can reduce substantial business risk with 
reliable predictable costs. The Cape and other U.S. sites 
will have to minimize and control launch costs and 
stabilize the overall environment to insure the LEO 
system organizations of reliable business planning data 
long before the satellites reach the launch site.
SMALL PAYLOAD MARKET POTENTIAL
The small satellite market has enormous potential for 
applications other than communications and navigation. 
Remote sensing systems now rely on medium and large
satellites that take an average development time of 4-5 
years and cost hundreds of millions of dollars. The only 
investors to date have been governments and only a few 
systems are in continual use. The U.S. Commerce 
department has sited remote sensing as a potential growth 
segment of the commercial space industry if certain issues 
can be addressed. The volatility and value of commer­ 
cially useable data from remote sensing satellites is now 
limited because the satellites in polar orbit overfly a 
particular region only once every 14 days. Studies have 
shown the commercial usefulness of the data increases 
with the increased frequency for comparison. Constella­ 
tions of smaller satellites over flying the same regions 
daily, the data can become more useful information 
regarding agriculture and resource management. One 
proposal by Dr. Edward Teller is based on the military 
Brilliant Eyes program. The system would consist of 48 
low earth orbiting satellites constantly observing the 
entire globe. Technology for detecting military launches 
can be directly applied to detecting impending crop 
failures. The Indian Space Research Organization has 
lead the field for many years in the development of cost 
effective small remote sensing technology mat can serve 
regional environmental monitoring, water and resource 
development, and sustainable agriculture. They will 
obviously participate in the future development of these 
technologies. NASA's once huge Earth Observation 
System platforms have been broken up into smaller 
segments, though still not considered lightsats, every 
indication is the trend is for even smaller EOS platforms.
The University of Surrey, U.K., the Norwegian Space 
Center of Oslo, and Arianespace have all conducted 
recent studies analyzing the markets for small satellites. 
The results point towards a growing market for small 
payloads that will change the complexion of the launch 
industry in the next 2-3 years. Small entrepreneurial 
launch vehicle builders who struggled to remain afloat 
during the past decade are increasingly optimistic about 
the 90's. Names like American Rocket Co., Orbital 
Sciences Corp., EER Systems, Microspace International, 
Bristol Aerospace, are expecting a share of the estimated 
12-24 launches annually by 1999. The future market 
potential based on current demand does not take in 
consideration the potential for advances in data process­ 
ing and sensor fusion applications or a growing demand 
in a newly invigorated post-cold war world. Traditional 
names in aerospace such as Motorola, TRW, Loral, 
Lockheed, Fairchild, and others are entering the small 
satellite market with multi-million dollar investments 
adding tremendous credibility to the segment. The United 
Nations authority is growing as is the interest in providing 
the benefits of space technology to the developing nations
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of the world. The 1992 "Rio" Earth Summit amplified 
the need for high tech agriculture, resource management, 
and environmental monitoring on a more global scale. 
The environmental industry is targeted by many as they 
next major growth industry.
RESPONDING TO THE MARKET
The next major market for launch services is now 
emerging. Small satellite systems that reduce technology 
risks, development time, and up front investments are 
destined to play a significant role in future space launch 
activities. The U.S. launch industry is now at one of those 
crossroads that occur so few times in a human life span. 
Strategic business alliances are now being formed across 
the globe that will have implications affecting the 
commercial launch market for decades. The U.S. launch 
industry infrastructure and policy is not prepared for this 
event and may be overwhelmed if actions are not forth­ 
coming. The launch industry and regulators need to 
consider a blank sheet of paper approach to stimulating 
the market for LEO satellite systems and other small 
payload launch. These systems will have heavy front end 
costs and razor thin profit margins as compared to the 
current medium sized payloads, the effect of delays and 
cumbersome range requirements could force the market to 
develop elsewhere.
The U.S. government and industry has a limited window 
of opportunity presenting itself in the case of the LEO 
systems and small launch market in general. The next 3-6 
months will see the approval and licensing process take 
place along with strategic financial relationships estab­ 
lished to promote these systems. If U.S. launchers and 
launch sites do not actively pursue this new market 
segment, others will. By inaction or inappropriate action 
we will help create the next generation of competitors for 
U.S. launch service providers and in all probability seal 
the fate of the U.S. commercial launch industry. A 
strategic effort needs to be initiated by commercial 
agencies now, to lead an organized comprehensive 
response to this emerging market before the U.S. finds 
itself reacting again to the vision of others.
Ralph De Palma is a commercial space consultant with 22 
years of aerospace experience, and is based at the Cape. 
His experience includes commercial launch operations 
and international marketing of space technologies. His 
current activities are focused on the impact of the LEO 
satellite systems on the Cape launch facilities and the 
international markets for LEO communications services.
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